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Abstract
We investigate the effects of the establishment of the euro on the
markups of French manufacturing firms. Merging firm-level census
data with customs data, we estimate time-varying firm-specific markups
and distinguish between eurozone exporters from other firms between
1995 and 2007. We find that the establishment of the euro has had a
pronounced pro-competitive impact by reducing firm markups by 14
percentage points. By reducing export costs, the euro represented an
opportunity for eurozone exporters to increase their margins relative
to other firms. Quantile regressions show that the euro has led to a
reduction in the variance of markups.
Key Words: Markups; Heterogeneity; Euro; Competition; Export Desti-
nations.
JEL codes: C5; D43; F61; L16; L60.
1 Introduction
Surprisingly, the question of the pro-competitive effect of the establishment
of the euro on markups has not been specifically addressed. The issue of
the euro and its effect on trade and productivity has largely been discussed,
beginning in 2000 with the so-called Rose effect (Rose 2000), which described
the effect of a common currency on trade. As of today, however, the issue
of the launch of the euro and its effect on firm market power has not been
investigated at the firm level. This paper intends to do so in the case of
French manufacturing firms.
Fifteen years after the launch of the euro, the financial crisis has chal-
lenged all positive arguments in favor of the euro and highlighted the in-
consistencies of the eurozone: the lack of innovative monetary policy; the
∗Email: sarah.guillou@sciencespo.fr
†Email: lionel.nesta@sciencespo.fr
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absence of an optimal currency area; and a lack of economic convergence.
By considering price-cost margins, this paper returns to the main positive
argument advocated by the proponents of the monetary union: the expected
pro-competitive effect on consumer prices, a process thought to improve wel-
fare considerably.
We expect the establishment of a unique currency to increase competi-
tion and therefore to decrease markups for three reasons. First, when all
prices are expressed in the same currency, arbitrage by consumers is facili-
tated considerably. Firms that were previously sheltered by their domestic
currency must then face competition with an array of foreign firms. The
second reason is that the establishment of a single currency zone is similar
to an increase in market size, thereby augmenting the number of firms in the
market. Finally, the creation of the euro increased the profit opportunities
associated with the access to a larger market, thereby intensifying firm entry
into the market and increasing competition.
The key to our analysis is the distinction between 1999 and 2002, the two
crucial dates concerning the new currency. In 1999, the launch of the euro
as the new currency of account led to a decrease in export costs for eurozone
exporters. Our intuition is that the establishment of fixed exchange rates in
1999 created an opportunity for eurozone exporters to increase their margins.
Hence, far from being a homogeneous shock that was common to all firms,
the launch of the euro concealed substantial heterogeneity in the response
of firms. Depending on the extent to which firms passed through the cost
cut to price or, alternatively, increased markups, the 1999 euro shock may
have been an opportunity for a rise in markups. In 2002, the generalization
of the use of the unique currency should have increased competition for the
reasons mentioned above. Moreover, with stiffer competition in the eurozone,
larger market size and new entries by firm are likely to have depressed firms’
markups irrespective of the export status of the firm. This sequence in the
introduction of the euro helps us to identify heterogenous responses by firms
to the euro shock.
Our research is motivated by the use of a recent methodology to esti-
mate markups, price over marginal cost, which varies by year and by firm.
Until recently, markup estimates were constant across firms within an in-
dustry or a time period, generally one year (Hall 1986, Roeger 1995, Klette
1999). In contrast, the methodology developed by De Loecker & Warzynski
(2012) generates time-varying, firm-specific markups. The key advantage
is that this methodology allows us to investigate the asymmetrical effects
of the euro on markups for different categories of firms, primarily types of
exporters. Another advantage in the use of this method is that it accounts
for changes in higher moments of the distribution of market power between
firms, notably, their variance documenting heterogeneity in firm markups.
Our understanding is that knowledge of the distribution is of crucial impor-
tance for the efficiency of any policy that aims to restore price-cost margins
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and their subsequent investments in quality upgrading and firm growth.
Whereas markups are expected to diminish after the establishment of
the euro, their variance is also expected to decrease for two reasons. First,
theoretically, firm markups have a lower bound at unity. This implies that
the magnitude of adjustment for firms with initially low markups is narrow,
whereas firms with higher markups can trim their margins more extensively.
Hence, we hypothesise that a common currency shock should be more detri-
mental to firm markups with initially large market power. Second, starting
with the seminal paper of Krugman (1987), a large literature has evidenced
pricing-to-market behavior consisting of adjusting markups to changes in the
exchange rate of the destination market. A partial pass-through of exchange
rate has been evidenced in many countries, mainly in sectors that produce
differentiated products. However, a partial pass-through has an immedi-
ate counterpart: a variation in markup per destination market. Therefore,
the introduction of the euro should have reduced the variance in markup,
reflecting the drop in the number of foreign currencies at stake.
Our empirical protocol uses the French census to gather financial infor-
mation on manufacturing firms covering the 1994-2007 period with data on
the export behavior of firms in terms of destination countries. The main
specification is similar to implementing a difference-in-difference model and
distinguishes firms that export exclusively to the eurozone from other ex-
porters. This model accounts for serial correlation in the error term and for
firm entry into and firm exit from domestic and foreign markets. We also de-
velop two additional specifications. First, the dichotomous nature of dummy
variables used in a difference-in-difference model makes no use of the amount
of export to the eurozone. However, such continuous information should re-
flect the exposure of the firm to the euro shock. A model that accounts for
this exposure is developed to allow firm markup to adapt gradually with the
share of exports to the eurozone. Second, we rely on quantile regressions
to account for the differentiated effect of the launch of the euro on firms,
depending on their initial level of markups.
In a nutshell, we obtain three main results. First, we find that the
generalization of the use of the euro in 2002 had a more pronounced pro-
competitive impact on markup – almost three times as large – as the estab-
lishment in 1999 of fixed exchange rates among eurozone countries. Second,
the launch of the euro has been an asymmetric shock for French manu-
facturing firms. By reducing transaction costs for firms that trade with
euro countries, the euro represented an opportunity for eurozone exporters
to increase their price-cost margins relative to other firms in the sample.
Third, the creation of the euro has led to a reduction in the heterogeneity
of firm markups. As such, the establishment of the euro acted as a strong
heterogeneity-reducing shock on markups.
This paper contributes to the controversial debate on the pros and cons of
3
the euro. Past empirical literature has investigated the effect of the establish-
ment of the euro on a series of economic phenomena. Initially documented
by Rose (2000), the trade effect of the common currency was largely and
intensely debated during the last decade, identifying a positive yet limited
impact on trade1. Bun & Klaassen (2007) evidenced a lower bound amount-
ing to 3%2.
Regarding the introduction of the euro and its impact on firm markups,
there is, to our knowledge, no empirical evidence using firm-level data. Cook
(2011) provides an empirical evaluation of the impact of the euro at the
macro level of markups. He shows a robust decrease in output labor share
per industry in 21 OECD countries when a fixed exchange rate policy is
implemented. He also finds a negative impact of eurozone membership on
the share of income paid to workers. He interprets this increase as an in-
crease in markups. However, this is an interpretation based on the fixed
price hypothesis; nothing is said about productivity, which also affects the
markups. At the firm level, Martin & Mejean (2012) document systematic
changes in pricing strategies – not markups per se – related to the common
currency and find that "monetary integration has heterogeneous effects on
firms of different sizes". This paper is thus the first to focus on firm-specific
markups and the impact of the introduction of the euro.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides detailed infor-
mation on the method by which firm-level markups and productivity are
simultaneously estimated. It also presents the database used and discusses
preliminary evidence on the dynamics of markups, productivity, and ex-
port behavior in French manufacturing before and after the establishment of
the common currency. Section 3 reports the results of the three economet-
ric specifications: difference-in-difference, exposure to the euro shock, and
quantile regression. Section 4 concludes.
2 Markup Estimates and Export Status
2.1 Simultaneous Estimations of Markups and Productivity
Similar to Hall (1986) and Roeger (1995), De Loecker & Warzynski (2012)
rely on the production function framework. Unlike previous contributions,
however, this framework neither imposes constant returns to scale nor re-
quires the computation of the user cost of capital, a task that is difficult
to perform accurately. Finally, this framework provides time-varying and
firm-specific estimates of markups and productivity that allow us to unravel
the heterogeneity in firms’ markup.
1See Flam & Nordström (2006). For a survey, see Baldwin (2006).
2In France, Berthou & Fontagné (2008) found a small effect of the euro on trade
stemming from the increase in the number of products exported per firm.
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Let Q be firm output as follows: Qit = Qit(Xit,Kit), where subscripts i
and t stand for firm i at time t, respectively, K is capital, and X is a vector
of production factors. In this framework, capital is assumed to be fixed,
whereas all remaining production factors are variable. We suppose that Q(·)
is twice differentiable and continuous and that the objective of the producer
is to minimize costs. The associated Lagrangian function then reads
Lit = PXitXit + ritKit + λit(Q¯it −Qit(Xit,Kit)), (1)
where PXit and rit are firm input prices for input vector X and capital,
respectively.
The first-order conditions satisfy
∂Lit
∂Xit
= PXit − λit
∂Qit(Xit,Kit)
∂Xit
= 0 (2)
and
∂Lit
∂Qit
= λit, (3)
which implies that λit represents the marginal cost of production.
Rearranging (2) and multiplying both sides by XitQit yields
∂Qit(Xit,Kit)
∂Xit
Xit
Qit
=
PXit Xit
λitQit
. (4)
The term on the left-hand side of Equation 4 is the output elasticity of
the variable inputs Xit, whereas the right-hand-side term is its share in total
cost.3 Now, defining firm markups µ as the price to marginal cost µit ≡ Pitλit ,
it follows that λit ≡ Pitµit . Inserting the former into Equation 4 and simplifying
yields
µXit =
θXit
αXit
, (5)
where the numerator θXit =
∂Qit(Xit,Kit)
∂Xit
Xit
Qit
represents the output elasticity
of input Xit and the denominator αXit =
PXit Xit
PitQit
is the share of input Xit in
total sales. Hence, to compute the markup µit, we need to compute both
θXit and α
X
it per firm and per time period. Although it is straightforward to
compute αXit , the estimation of θ
X
it is more demanding.
At the outset, two important choices need to be made explicit. First, we
limit the set of variable inputs to labor L only. One could think of inserting
additional production factors, such as material M or energy consumption
3This is true when at the optimal point of production, the marginal cost equalizes the
average cost due to the free entry of firms into the market.
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E. Theoretically, if all factor markets were perfect, the markup derived
from material must yield the same value as the markup derived from labor:
µMit = µ
L
it. However, differences in factor markets’ imperfections will yield
different values of firm markups (µMit 6= µLit). Instead, we limit vector X to
labor L only and assume a perfect labor market4. This also implies that we
define output Q as value added.
The second important choice involves the functional form of Q(·). The
most common candidate is the Cobb-Douglas framework. This functional
form would yield an estimate of the output elasticity of labor that would be
common to the set of firms to which the estimation pertains: θˆLit = θˆ
L, hence,
θˆLit = θˆ
L
jt for all firms i and j, i 6= j, included in the estimation sample. It
follows that the heterogeneity of firm markups and the ratio of the output
elasticity of labor on its revenue share would simply reflect heterogeneity in
the revenue share of labor: µLit =
θX
αLit
. Therefore, we prefer to use the translog
production function because it generates markups whose distribution is not
solely determined by heterogeneity in the revenue share of labor, as will be
clear below.
To obtain consistent estimates of the output elasticity of labor θLit, we
restrict our attention to production functions with a scalar Hicks-neutral
productivity term and with technology parameters that are common across
firms. Thus, we have the following expression for the production function:
Qit = F (Lit,Kit;B), (6)
where B is a set of technology parameters to be estimated. Let qit be the
translog production function:
qit = βllit + βkkit + βlklitkit + βkkk
2 + βlll
2 + ωit + εit, (7)
where smaller cases indicate the log transform, ω is a measure of the true
productivity, and  is true noise 5. The estimation of vector B is challenged
by the correlation of variable input L with the productivity term ωit, which
is known by the entrepreneur but not by the econometrician. The resulting
endogeneity of labor L would yield inconsistent estimates for vector B. To
overcome the problem of endogeneity, we use a control function approach,
as in Olley & Pakes (1996) or Levinsohn & Petrin (2003), using demand for
material to proxy for productivity:
mit = mt(kit, ωit, EDit), (8)
4Although highly relevant, this issue represents a research program of its own; to our
knowledge, all methods that measure market power need to assume a perfect market in
at least one of the variable inputs.
5Note that we recover the Cobb Douglas (CD) production function in logs when omit-
ting higher-order terms (βkkk2, βlll2) and the interaction term βlklitkit.
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where EDit is an indicator variable set to unity if the firm records positive
exports and 0 otherwise. The inclusion of the firm’s exporting behavior in
the first stage of the estimation algorithm illustrates the need to control for
firm characteristics that may affect factor demand (De Loecker & Warzynski
2012). Firm export behavior is an important feature that may affect both
the quantity and the quality of the optimally desired input.
As in Olley & Pakes (1996), one can then invert the function and write
productivity ω as follows:
ωit = ht(kit,mit, EDit). (9)
Step 1 starts with the following estimation:
qit = φ(lit, kit,mit, EDit) + εit, (10)
where the function form of φ is set to the third-order polynomials and a
full vector of interactions. This first step is used to generate an estimate of
expected output φˆit and εit. Let productivity ω be the residual defined as
follows:
ωit(β) = φˆit − βˆllit − βˆkkit − βˆlklitkit − βˆlll2it − βˆkkk2it. (11)
Defining the law of motion for productivity as a first-order Markov pro-
cess allows us to recover true innovation ξit in the productivity equation:
ωit = gt(ωit−1) + EDit + ξit. (12)
As suggested by Ackerberg et al. (2006), we use the following moments
to obtain our estimates of the production function:
E
ξit (β)

lit−1
kit
l2it−1
k2it
lit−1kit

 = 0. (13)
Equation (13) provides the orthogonality conditions to estimate (7) and
obtain the estimated output elasticity of labor θˆLit:
θˆLit = βˆl + 2βˆlllit + βˆlkkit. (14)
From Equation 14, it is clear that θˆL is firm specific because both l and
k are themselves firm specific and reflect the production technology of the
firm. We compute the revenue share of labor as follows:
αLit =
witLit
PitQ˜it
, (15)
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where w represents the firm’s average wage and Q˜ = exp(εˆ)−1Q. Finally,
with information on αLit and θˆ
L
it, one can compute the markups for each firm
i at time t:
µˆit =
θˆLit
αLit
. (16)
2.2 Preliminary Evidence on Markups, Productivity, Export
Behavior and the Euro in French Manufacturing
We use a panel database of French firms covering the 1994-2007 period.
Data come from the annual survey of companies (EAE) led by the statis-
tical department of the French Ministry of Industry on all manufacturing
sectors. The survey covers all French firms with at least 20 employees in
the manufacturing sectors. EAE data provide information on the financial
income and balance sheet, from which we retrieve data on sales (corrected
for stock variations), value added, labor, number of hours worked, capital
stock, and materials. Information on the export behavior of firms in terms of
destination countries is retrieved from the French custom database. Merging
financial statements from EAE with the custom data yields a final database
of approximately 235,000 firm-year observations. Appendix A provides more
information on the data and the series of deflators used in this paper.
Table 1 presents the main variables (in logs) used in the computation of
firm-year markups and productivity indices for all manufacturing sectors and
by industry.6 The use of the lagged value of labor as instruments trims the
number of observations to 215,049. The average markup across all industries
and over the time period is 33%, a value that is considerably higher than
the one found in Bellone et al. (2009), which amounts to 12% between 1990
and 2004.7 The computed markups are of similar magnitude as the average
of 28% provided by De Loecker & Warzynski (2012, 28%) for the case of
Croatian companies and compare well with the operating margin rate of
32.6% provided by INSEE, the French Office for National Statistics.8
[Table 1 about here.]
The overall computed means conceal substantial cross-industry hetero-
geneity. For example, the average markup in "Manufacture of Coke and
Fuel" is higher than that found in "Printing and Publishing" by an order
of 5 (60.5% and 11.4%, respectively). The F-statistics lead us to conclude
6All translog coefficients have been estimated by industry.
7The main explanation for this gap lies in the methodology used. Roeger’s approach
(Roeger 1995) uses variables that are expressed in first differences, a procedure known to
produce a downward bias in the estimated parameters (the markup, in this case).
8The operating margin rate is measured at the firm level as the ratio of operating
income over value added.
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that markups, together with all firm-level variables, are industry specific.9
Therefore, in the following, we transform all variables by subtracting the
industry average. However, the industry-specific effect explains only 10% of
the variance of firm-level markups. This leaves considerable room for firm-
level explanatory variables that must explain the variance of markups. We
mainly think of productivity, size and exposure to international trade.
The estimation of firm-year markups and TFP allows us to plot their
dynamics over the whole time frame. The solid line of Figure 1 displays
the mean, the markers "x" show the median, and the vertical lines show the
interquartile range for each year. The substantial decrease in markups begins
in 1999 and continues to 2003, remaining at this level until 2005. The years
2006 and 2007 witness a rise in the average markups. Although surprising,
this rise is fully consistent with the evolution of the operating margin rate
as provided by INSEE.10. It is difficult to conclude that there is a significant
change in the interquartile range. Hence, whether the introduction of the
euro is associated with changes in the distribution of markups across firms
remains an open issue.
[Figure 1 about here.]
The introduction of the euro may have had two opposite and se-
quential effects on the level of markups. First, the launch of the euro in
1999 is similar to reducing transaction costs for firms that trade with other
euro countries. For these firms, the new exchange rate fixity is similar to a
cancellation of all menu costs associated with changes in currency. Hence,
one can expect a positive effect of the establishment of the euro on markups
for eurozone exporters, the extent of which depends on whether firms choose
to pass through the cost reduction to prices or to increase their markups. To
capture this opportunity effect, we set variable dp99 to unity if year t exceeds
1999 and 0 otherwise: dp99 = 1 if t ≥ 1999 and dp99 = 0 if t < 1999. Second,
in 2002, the introduction of the euro to all economic agents – including final
consumers – must be considered yet another step toward a more integrated
European market, leading to an increase in product market competition. Be-
cause consumers became more able to arbitrate between products from dif-
ferent euro countries, it enlarged the European market, causing an increase
in competition from foreign firms. This competitive effect is reinforced by
the fact that the creation of the eurozone increased the profit opportunities
associated with access to a larger market and acted as an incentive for new
firms to enter the market. Although we expect the positive effect of the in-
troduction of the euro on markups to begin in 1999, we expect the negative
9Although statistically significant, there is considerably less inter-industry variance in
the case of TFP (ω).
10See http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/tableau.asp?reg_id=0&id=180.
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effect to occur after 2002. Hence, we define variable dp02 as unity if the year
t exceeds 2002 and 0 otherwise.
The export status is provided by the French customs database, which
allows us to recover information on the volume of exports by destination.
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics about the participation rates, the ex-
port intensity, and the entry and exit rates by destination markets and time
period11. Over the 1995-2007 period, 58% of companies exported to destina-
tion markets located in the eurozone (DestEZ) and 68% exported to markets
outside the eurozone (DestNEZ). These figures amount to an export par-
ticipation rate of almost 73%. The overall export intensity reaches 28%
and is almost equally divided between eurozone and non-eurozone markets.
Moreover, because the entry rate exceeds the exit rate across all destina-
tion markets, this time period witnessed the net entry of firms into export
markets and an increase in the export participation rate.
Producing these figures by time period leads us to observe that the two
time periods of 1999-2001 and 2002-2007 conceal contrasted statistics. Dur-
ing 1999-2001, the sudden rise in export participation to almost 74% is
mainly due to the net entry of firms into eurozone markets at the expense of
non-eurozone markets. This rise is accompanied by an impressive increase in
the export intensity of firms supplying eurozone markets, from 12.7% to 15%,
and its concomitant decrease from 15.7% to 14.4% for non-eurozone markets.
This preliminary evidence is consistent with the idea that the launch of the
euro in 1999 was tantamount to reducing export costs to eurozone markets,
thereby favoring the entry of firms. In the last period of 2002-2007, both the
participating rate and the export intensity of firms exporting to the euro-
zone decreased, indicating the net exit of firms from eurozone markets. This
finding is consistent with the idea that the introduction of a fiduciary euro
in 2002 increased competition across all eurozone markets and led to the net
exit of the least competitive firms.
[Table 2 about here.]
Using information about the destinations of exports, we define three ex-
clusive dummy variables for the export status of firms. We distinguish non-
exporters from exporters to the eurozone exclusively (dEZ), exporters outside
the eurozone (dNEZ), and exporters to both the eurozone and outside the
eurozone, which we call global exporters (dG). Eurozone exporters are those
firms that export in the eurozone, whereas global exporters have at least one
destination outside the eurozone. Non-eurozone exporters have customers
exclusively outside the eurozone. Global exporters, eurozone exporters, and
non-eurozone exporters represent 53%, 5% and 15% of French manufacturing
firms, respectively.
11See the table footnote for information on the computation of the series of ratios
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Table 3 displays summary statistics on computed markups per period
and per export status. We observe that both the markup and the TFP
of exporters exceeds that of non-exporters significantly, a stylized fact that
is now well documented. Exporters self-select into export markets because
their productivity advantage provides financial resources necessary for entry
into foreign markets (ISGEP 2008). Exporters also charge higher markups,
either as a result of their productivity advantage or as an expression of a
price elasticity that differs in international markets (De Loecker &Warzynski
2012). Moreover, all means regarding firm markups and TFP indices differ
significantly across export status.
[Table 3 about here.]
The top panel of Figure 2 displays the kernel distributions for markups by
time period. We observe a leftward move, identifying a decrease in markup
without a change in variance among firms. Table 4 provides the results
from the Student t-tests and Kolmogorov Smirnov (KS) tests addressing the
questions of homogeneity across export status and across years. The former
tests address the issue of equality of group means, whereas the KS test
addresses the issue of stochastic dominance of one distribution over another.
All tests are significant. The KS tests show that the distribution of the first
period (1995-1998) stochastically dominates that of the second period (1999-
2001) and that the distribution of the second period stochastically dominates
that of the last period (2002-2007). Hence, most firms have experienced a
decline in markups over time.
[Figure 2 about here.]
Similarly, the bottom panel of Figure 2 shows kernel distributions for
markups by export status. We observe a rightward move from non-exporters
to global exporters. The KS tests show that the distribution of global ex-
porters stochastically dominates that of exporters to the eurozone. The
distribution of EZ exports dominates that of NEZ, which dominates that of
non exporters. Significant differences in markups across export status are
difficult to interpret. Bellone et al. (2014) show that the size of the destina-
tion market, its wealth and its geographic distance to the local market can
affect the level of markups.
[Table 4 about here.]
Table 3 also provides the mean values of both markups and productivity
by export status and by time period. At first glance, decreases in aver-
age markup and increases in productivity from the first to the third period
are observed. This finding is consistent with the idea that productivity in-
creased with time and that the establishment of the common market and the
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launch of the euro led to an increase in competition and, hence, a decrease
in markups. These trends are observed irrespective of the export status for
markups or for the productivity indices. Nevertheless, it remains difficult
to draw conclusions regarding the heterogeneity in markups: interquartile
ranges (IQR) in markups seem to have increased from 1995-1998 to 1999-
2001 and then decreased in the last period of 2002-2007. Heterogeneity in
TFP, both in terms of variance and IQR, increased over time. These trends
are observed irrespective of the export status.
These findings provide preliminary evidence that the introduction of the
euro is concomitant with significant variations in markups, which may differ
across firms. The next section intends to provide econometric evidence of
the differentiated impact of the establishment of the common currency on
firm markups.
3 Markups and Firm-level Responses to the Intro-
duction of the Euro
3.1 Econometric Specification
The empirical model explains markups µ of firm i at time t, as derived from
Equation 16, conditional on firm export status dX and the time period of
observation dp. The empirical model reads
µit =
∑
X
βXdX,it +
∑
p
βpdp,it +
∑
X,p
βX,p(dX × dp)it
+ µ0 + µ1ωit + λt+BC+ ui + it,
(17)
where X = {EZ;NEZ;G}, p = {p99;p02}, letter d denotes binary variables,
µ0 is the constant, ω is firm TFP and µ1 its associated parameter, t is a linear
time trend and its parameter λ provides the percentage-point change in µ,
C is a vector of additional controls, and B is its associated vector of param-
eter estimates. The term ui is a firm fixed effect controlling for unobserved
heterogeneity, and it is the error term. Because the two time-period dummy
variables dp99 and dp02 overlap, interpretation of their associated parameters
will be additive for all years greater than 2002. These two dummies also
control for the overall impact of the introduction of the euro on markups,
irrespective of the export status. The parameters of interest are the series
of βs, whose value indicates the response of firms according to their export
status and the period of interest.
This model is similar – but not identical – to the so-called difference-
in-differences model (DID, henceforth), which classically compares a treated
group with a control group. However, it is not clear what defines the treat-
ment and which firms constitute the treated and the control groups. If the
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euro is the treatment, the introduction of the euro applies to all companies
regardless of their export status, whereas in a DID model, the treatment ap-
plies to the treated group only. If eurozone exporters are the treated group,
it is not clear what the counterfactual group should be. Although non-
exporting firms are obviously eligible, it is not clear how firms that export
exclusively outside the eurozone should be considered. Therefore, specifi-
cation 17 resembles a DID model but is not a model in its most standard
fashion.
Our intent to isolate the effect of the establishment of the euro condi-
tional on export destination leads us to interact the euro period with the
three exclusive export status. We expect βEZ,p99 to be positive following the
decrease in transaction costs (opportunity effect), whereas βEZ,p02 should be
negative (competitive effect). Heterogeneity in firm responses to the shock
induced by the introduction of the euro is provided by first comparing βEZ,p99
with βNEZ,p99 and βG,p99 to identify the opportunity effect and second com-
paring βEZ,p02 with βNEZ,p02 and βG, p02 to identify the differential impact
of the competitive effect with respect to export status.
Bertrand et al. (2004) warn about the use of a DID-type model with panel
data because the outcome variable may be serially correlated. In such a case,
the resulting standard errors for the coefficients of interest are known to be
inconsistent. Their proposed solution is twofold. First, one can estimate cor-
rected standard errors by bootstrapping samples on firms and keeping the
entire series of information for firm i. This approach preserves the autocor-
relation structure, which is then corrected by clustering the standard errors
by firms. Second, the alternative solution is to average the data by time pe-
riod to minimize the time-series information. Because the resulting sample
consists of three time periods, the specification with a firm fixed effect still
holds.
[Table 5 about here.]
[Table 6 about here.]
Vector C includes variables that may presumably affect the level of
markups above and beyond their export destinations and volumes. We in-
clude firm size measured by overall sales , the share of imports of an industry
whose provenance is from low-wage countries, and the degree of openness of
a given industry, defined as the share of trade – imports and exports – over
the value added of that industry. Specifications 17 can be estimated by least
squares with standard errors clustered by firms.12 The definition of variables
12We follow Bernard et al. (2006), who classify low-wage countries as countries for which
per capita GDP does not exceed 5% of that of the US. The list includes Afghanistan, Al-
bania, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Burundi,
Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Comoros, Congo, Equatorial, Eritrea,
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and the data sources are provided in Table 5, and the descriptive statistics
are provided in Table 6.
3.2 Export Status and the Introduction of the Euro
We first proceed with least-squares regression by sequentially introducing the
key variables. We do not introduce any particular control apart from TFP,
so these results should be seen as merely descriptive statistics controlling for
TFP. The results are displayed in Table 7.
In Column (1), the base markup for all firms (the constant) amounts
to 1.107, which implies a pooled price-cost margin of 10.7%. We observe
a positive correlation between µ and ω (+0.143), which suggests that more
productive firms enjoy higher markup. Exporters display a 0.118 markup
premium.13. These preliminary remarks are coherent with the empirical
literature, which repeatedly shows that exporters outperform non-exporters
in several dimensions, such as productivity, wage per employee, size and
markups.
Regarding the introduction of the euro, the two ’euro dummies’ are neg-
ative and significant, which suggests that the establishment of the common
currency acted as a competitive shock and forced firms to decrease their
markups. Parameter βˆp99 is negative, suggesting that the competitive effect
is effective prior to 2002. This could be caused by firms anticipating the
2002 eurozone final establishment from both incumbents and new entrants,
with the former adjusting their markups downward to prepare the run-up
phase toward a more integrated market and the latter entering the eurozone
markets before the introduction of the euro due to decreased sunk entry costs
in the eurozone markets.
Observe that parameter βˆp02 is four times as large as βˆp99. This differ-
ence in magnitude is persistent across specifications (1) to (4). This finding
suggests that on the supply side, the competitive effect is stronger in 2002,
whereas on the demand side, the ability of consumers from 2002 onwards to
compare similar products across eurozone markets had a substantial impact.
The figures from Table 3 indicate that firm entry into the eurozone mar-
ket was more important in the first period (1999-2001) than in the second
(2002-2007). This finding suggests an over-adjustment effect of numerous
firm entries followed by various firm exits in the second period due to the
strengthening of the competition.
In Column (2), the export status distinguishes EZ, NEZ and global ex-
Ethiopia, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, In-
dia, Kenya, Lao PDR, Leone, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania,
Moldova, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Pakistan, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao, Sierra, Somalia, Sri
Lanka, St. Vincent, Sudan, Togo, Tome, Uganda, Vietnam, and Yemen.
13A firm becoming an exporter and having an average level of productivity should have
a markup equal to µ = 1.107 + ω¯ × 0.143 + 0.118 before the introduction of the euro
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porters. All types of exporters enjoy higher markups, with global exporters
enjoying higher markups and exporters outside the eurozone having lower
markups than EZ exporters. Interpretation is not straightforward because
information on the destination market is likely to capture two opposite ef-
fects (Bellone et al. 2014): one positive (the wealth of the destination country,
which acts as a proxy for product quality) and one negative (the distance to
the destination market, which decreases the markup by increasing distribu-
tion costs).
In Columns (3) and (4), we explore the contrasted effect of the establish-
ment of the euro on markups by interacting the period dummies with the
export status. In Column (3), the interaction term concerns only the first
period of 1999-2007. This interaction is positive and significant for EZ ex-
porters (+0.016) and negative and significant for global exporters (−0.010).
Summing the parameter estimates with the autonomous effect βˆp99, we ob-
serve that the establishment of the euro is associated with a decrease in
markups of 1.1 percentage points for EZ exporters and 3.7 percentage points
for global exporters.
Interacting the export status with the second period of 2002-2007 (Col-
umn 4) eliminates the significance for all interacted effects in the first period
but leads to similar results for the second period. This interaction is positive
and near significant for EZ exporters (+0.015) and negative and significant
for global exporters (−0.028). Summing the parameter estimates with the
autonomous effect βˆp02, we observe that the general use of the euro in 2002
is associated with a severe decrease in markups of 9.4 percentage points for
EZ exporters and 13.7 percentage points for global exporters. This finding
suggests that the euro shock was milder for exporters to the eurozone than
other firms and more severe for global exporters.
[Table 7 about here.]
The estimation of equation 17 represents the key results of the specifica-
tion. These results are displayed in table 8. In Column (5), in addition to a
linear time trend, we introduce a series of firm-level and industry-level vari-
ables, and we control for unobserved firm heterogeneity. First, we observe
that the 2002 shock is three times as large as the 1999 shock. Interactions
with the export status reveal that the 1999 shock allowed eurozone exporters
to partially compensate the 3.3 percentage point decrease in markup by 2.2
points so that the net effect amounts to a decrease of 1.1 percentage points.14
Our interpretation is that the 1999 shock represented an opportunity for
eurozone exporters to rejuvenate their margins because the newly fixed ex-
change rate was tantamount to reducing transaction costs, which arguably,
represent a significant part of their export costs.
14For clarity, we do not report the autonomous effect of the export status variables. In
a firm fixed-effect model, the estimated parameter estimates only report the effect of a
change in the export status, whereas we are interested in the interaction effect.
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Although global exporters also experienced a reduction in export fixed
costs proportional to their relative involvement in the eurozone, their markups
did not increase in 1999 relative to other firms. Instead, the 2002 shock was
more severe by −2.4 percentage points, with the net effect reaching −12.5
percentage points. Our understanding is that after 2002, the appreciation
of the euro was detrimental to their margins. There is an issue with regard
to non-eurozone exporters: why would they not undergo the same effect
as global exporters, although they too experienced a similar change in the
euro? Our tentative explanation is as follows: global exporters export dif-
ferentiated products (similar to EZ exporters), whereas NEZ exporters are
likely to sell products of a lower quality that are more substitutable and,
consequently, have lower markups. Indeed, descriptive statistics show that
for export status, EZ exporters have the lowest markups. Because they have
low price-cost margins, their ability to adjust by decreasing their markups
is mechanically reduced. Instead, firms are forced to withdraw from export
markets. This hypothesis is supported by the descriptive statistics in Table
3, which display a clear decrease in the share of outside eurozone exporters
over the period, from 16.8% in the first period to 14.8% in the third period.
In the remaining regressions, we control for entry into and exit from domes-
tic and export markets to account for any potential selection effect on the
estimated coefficients.
The sign of the control variables conforms to our intuition. Firm size
is positively associated with markups, suggesting that the exploitation of
economies of scale allows the firm to price above its marginal cost of produc-
tion. Firm size is similar to controlling for a host of firm-level unobserved
characteristics, notably monopsony power in the input factors markets, which
may affect firms’ product market power. However, including size does not
affect our previous conclusion on the euro effect. Efficiency in production
(TFP) allows firms to increase their margins. Finally, we observe that com-
petition from low-wage countries has a negative and significant on the deter-
mination of markups. This finding indicates that the entry of new players
in the market arena forced firms to discipline themselves in their price be-
havior. Sector openness and grasping the globalization of markets and the
international division of labor are not related to price-cost margins.
[Table 8 about here.]
Columns (6) to (9) display the results of the same specification using
different sub-samples to account for any change in markups due to selection
effects. Column (6) controls for industry churning by excluding firms that
entered or exited domestic markets between 1998 and 2003. The results
are fully consistent with prior estimates, inflating the estimated opportunity
effect of 1999 for EZ exporters by a factor of 1.5 (+0.031) with respect to
Column (5). Column (7) represents the key result of the table, where only
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firms that do not change export status between 1998 and 2003 are included
in the sample.15 Following the recommendation of Bertrand et al. (2004),
we bootstrap on individual firms to retain all the time-series information by
randomly selected cross-section.16 First, we observe that the 2002 shock is
double that of 1999. The true competitive shock occurred in 2002. Adding
the two effects amounts to a substantial 13.8 percentage point decrease in
price cost margins.
Although less efficient, parameter βˆEZ,p99 (+0.052) indicates that euro-
zone exporters could entirely compensate for the competitive effect of the
euro on markup (βˆp99 = −0.046). Observe that the interactions with other
export status suggest that they too could accommodate the competitive
shock to a milder threshold (βˆNEZ,p99 = +0.014 and βˆG,p99 = +0.016).
What these two groups have in common relative to EZ exporters is that
they may have benefited from the 1999-2002 depreciation of the euro (no-
tably, with respect to the US dollar), leading them to increase their markups
when keeping local-currency prices constant. The 2002 shock was more se-
vere (βˆp02 = −0.092) for all firms in general and for global exporters in par-
ticular (βˆG,p02 = −0.028), leading to a decrease in their markups amounting
to 12 percentage points.
Another strategy is to minimize the time-series information and compute
averages by period and by individual firms (Bertrand et al. 2004). Because
of the three time periods, the panel dimension is 3, and we compute robust
standard errors to account for the residual serial correlation in the error
term. The results displayed in Column (8) corroborate the previous remarks.
Finally, in Column (9), we produce a sample of firms that matches the char-
acteristics of eurozone exporters in TFP, size, competition from low-wage
countries and openness to international trade in 1997, trimming the number
of observations to 8,000, which corresponds to 790 companies.17 The objec-
tive here is to produce a counterfactual sample that shares the characteristics
of EZ exporters in various dimensions (with the exception of markups µ) to
interpret differences in export status as heterogeneous firm responses to a
common shock. Although this exercise produces similar results qualitatively,
some interaction variables are amplified in magnitude (βˆEZ,p99 = +0.090,
βˆNEZ,p99 = +0.034 and βˆEZ,p02 = −0.138). When comparing EZ exporters
with firms of similar characteristics, we observe the largest variations in
markups following the introduction of the euro concerns eurozone exporters.
Taking stock of our results thus far, we conclude that the two shocks
related to the establishment of the euro substantially increased competition
in French manufacturing industries, implying a dramatic decrease in markups
15We classify firms according to their export behavior between 1998 and 2003 irrespec-
tive of their export status for the remaining years.
16In the terminology of the authors, we "block bootstrap".
17See Appendix B reporting the results from the matching procedure.
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of circa 14 percentage points. The 2002 shock was significantly more severe
than the initial one. Importantly, both shocks were asymmetrical, benefitting
eurozone exporters in 1999 relative to all other companies and harming global
exporters more severely after 2002. It is consistent with our intuition that
the introduction of the euro in 1999 significantly reduced export costs within
the eurozone and was an opportunity for such exporters to increase their
markups. The control variables behave as expected. There is an issue with
the variable openness, suggesting that globalization may have discriminated
firms in some fashion.
3.3 Exposure to the Euro Shocks
The previous econometric specification distinguishes firms that export to
the eurozone (dEZ) from those that export outside the eurozone (dNEZ) and
those that export globally (dG). One could object that vector βX,p fails
to accurately grasp the response of firms to the euro shock. First, global
exporters also export to the eurozone markets; therefore, both groups dEZ
and dG are potentially affected by the introduction of the euro, whereas only
outside eurozone exporters directly experienced the change in the euro value.
By using the share of export to the eurozone, we can focus on the eurozone
competitive effect only and discard the effect of the appreciation of the euro.
Second, the dichotomous nature of dummy variables makes no use of the
amount of exports to the eurozone. This information acts as an exposure
to the shock induced by the introduction of the euro, allowing the markup
to adapt gradually with the share of exports to the eurozone. Therefore, an
alternative empirical model could read as follows:
µit =β1αEZ,it +
∑
p
βpdp,it +
∑
p
βp,EZ
(
αEZ × dp
)
it
+ β2 lnXit + µ0 + µ1ωit + λt+BC+ ui + it,
(18)
where letter d and vector p are defined as previously, lnX is the log-transformed
value of overall exports18, and αEZ is the share of exports to the eurozone:
αEZ = XEZ/X. Variable αEZ is interpreted as the exposure of the firm
exporting to the eurozone to the introduction of the euro, and βEZ,p99 and
βEZ,p02 are the responses by firms from a unit variation in α. Table 9 dis-
plays the results for the same sub-samples defined in the previous subsection.
In our comments, we concentrate on Column (12), including firms that are
stable in their export behavior and excluding firms that entered or exited
the market between 1998 and 2003. The remaining columns are displayed
for robustness checks.
18To account for firms that do not export where X = 0, the log transform is performed
as follows: ln(X + 1).
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[Table 9 about here.]
The two dummy variables for the introduction of the euro keep their
negative sign and significance; the pro-competitive effect of the post-2002
era is far more dramatic for price-cost margins. We observe that firms that
export to the eurozone have higher markups and that the larger the share
of exports to the eurozone, the higher the markups. The interaction of
αEZ with the two time period dummies yields consistent results with our
previous findings. The 1999-2001 period, which established fixed exchange
rates across the currencies of the eurozone, was tantamount to reducing
export costs to the eurozone and providing an opportunity for such exporters
to increase their margins. Conversely, the introduction of the currency in
general use in 2002 acted as a very strong pro-competitive effect for intensive
exporters to the eurozone. This finding sheds light on the result of Table
8: global exporters suffer the most from the competitive effect, not only
because they have to face the appreciation of the euro but also because
global exporters are those with the largest export intensity to the eurozone
on average.19
Another satisfaction comes from the stability of the parameter estimates
for the remaining control variables, such as TFP, size, low-wage imports and
the absence of significance of openness. This finding reinforces our confidence
in our results and in the idea that the introduction of the euro had a strong
pro-competitive effect on markups but that this effect was asymmetrical,
depending on the export behavior of firms and the degree of exposure to the
euro shock.
3.4 Heterogeneity in Firm Response to the Introduction of
the Euro
Quantile regression techniques are an alternative to least squares that pro-
vide an estimation of the heterogeneous impact of any explanatory variable
on the dependent variable. Our motivation comes from the fact that the
introduction of the euro may be heterogenous, not only in terms of exposure
to exports but also in its impact on markups depending on the initial mar-
ket power of firms. In essence, the spirit of quantile regression is to produce
quantile-specific marginal effects βˆτ , where τ is the desired quantile.
To account for unobserved heterogeneity in a quantile regression setting,
we rely on the two-step estimator developed by Canay (2011). In the first
step, we perform a least squares regression in which we introduce firm fixed
19Unreported statistics show that the ratio of exports to the eurozone in sales is 11.7%
and 13.6% for EZ and global exporters, respectively. The contrast is sharper when consid-
ering the median of the ratio, with 2.3% and 7.3% for EZ and global exporters, respectively.
Because global exporters are considerably larger than EZ exporters, the former outperform
the latter in the volume of exports by a factor of 10.
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effects and then define µ˘it = µit− uˆi, where uˆi is the least square estimate of
the firm fixed effect. In the second step, we estimate a traditional quantile
regression on the transformed dependent variable µ˘it as follows:
Qµ˘(τ |Z) = β1(τ)αEZ +
∑
p
βp(τ)dp +
∑
p
βp,EZ(τ)
(
αEZ × dp
)
+ β2(τ) lnX + µ0(τ) + µ1(τ)ω + λ(τ)t+B(τ)C+ F
−1
 (τ),
(19)
where Z is the vector of explanatory variables, subscripts i and t have been
omitted for the sake of clarity, τ ∈ (0, 1) and F−1 (τ) denotes the common
distribution function of the errors. In his contribution, Canay (2011) shows
that estimation of the covariance matrix can be achieved by bootstrapping
on the set of observations. Table 10 displays the estimations of quantiles
(Columns 15 to 19) for various values of τ and recalls the results from the
least squares solution (Column 12 from Table 9).
[Table 10 about here.]
We use the restricted sample, including firms present at least from 1998
to 2003 that do not change export status. The quantile estimates indicate
that the introduction of the euro has been far more dramatic for firms with
an initially high market power, decreasing their markups by almost 6.7 per-
centage points for the 90th percentile of the distribution in the 1999-2001
period and by 11.2 percentage points in the post-2002 era, leading to an
overall effect of an almost 18 percentage point decrease for firms located
in the right tail of the distribution. Conversely, firms with a lower market
power have decreased theirs by less than 9.1 percentage points since 1999
(βˆp99(τ = 0.1) + βˆp02(τ = 0.1) = −0.091). Therefore, the introduction of
the euro and the subsequent increase in competition have had an important
heterogeneity-decreasing effect on the distribution of markups.
A more thorough examination of the heterogeneity of the overall euro ef-
fect is found in Figure 3. In the upper and bottom left quadrants, the actual
effect is displayed for each of the 5th to the 95th percentiles. The grey area
displays its corresponding 95th confidence interval. The horizontal solid and
dashed lines represent the OLS effect with a 95th confidence interval. We
observe that the actual OLS effect conceals a great deal of heterogeneity in
the euro effect, where the most severe downward adjustments in the markups
are to be found in the largest markups. This must be expected; theoreti-
cally, firm markups have a lower bound at unity. Thus, the magnitude of
adjustment for firms with initially lower markups is narrower, whereas firms
with higher markups can trim their margins more extensively.
Importantly, the sign of the slope depicted by the graph across the quan-
tiles is another indication of the effect of a given variable on the variance
of markups. More precisely, a negative slope is tantamount to observing an
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effect that decreases the variance of the dependent variable because observa-
tions located in the right tail of the distribution adapt at a lower pace than
observations located in the left tail. In the case of markups by boosting
competition, the introduction of the euro has clearly reduced heterogeneity
in market power across firms. The positive 1999 effect of exposure and the
negative 2002 effect of exposure are homogenous across firms.
[Figure 3 about here.]
Firm characteristics, whether size or productivity, have a heterogeneity-
increasing impact on markups. The quantile regression tells us that a change
in size has a larger impact on markups when firms have an initially strong
market power – a large markup. Although statistically significant, the change
in the marginal effect from the 1st to the 9th decile is economically small. A
similar heterogeneity-enhancing effect is found for productivity ω. Comput-
ing the difference βˆω(τ = 0.1)− βˆω(τ = 0.9) = 0.179, we conclude that pro-
ductivity gains are far more beneficial for firms with initially higher markups.
Figure 4 illustrates clearly and neatly the marginal effect of size and of pro-
ductivity and the increasing slope, indicating that both size and productivity
increase heterogeneity in markups across firms.
[Figure 4 about here.]
The positive slope across quantiles of the marginal effects of the variables
on international competition (LW import share) and globalization (openness)
provides evidence of their heterogeneity-enhancing effect on markups. First,
looking at the effect of competition from low-wage countries, we observe
that firms with lower markups have suffered the most from the emergence
of such countries. If one reads markup as an inverse proxy for the degree of
substitution, this can be interpreted as a sign that these countries started
by producing goods where the substitution effect is highest. Computing
∆βˆLWI yields an impressive 24.5 percentage point differential. The upper
right quadrant of Figure 4 illustrates this impressive differential. Finally, the
sign of "openness" depends of the firm’s location in the markup distribution.
The effect is negative for firms with initially low markups and positive for
firms with higher markups. The bottom right quadrant of Figure 4 illustrates
the fact that the difference in sign is located at the median of the distribution.
Our interpretation is that globalization represents a markup opportunity for
firms with larger markups and has a pro-competitive effect only for firms
with lower markups. Although not at the core of our paper, this result is
crucial to understand the role of globalization in exacerbating differences in
efficiency across firms.
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4 Conclusion
We have investigated the effects of the introduction of the euro on the
markups of French manufacturing firms. Relying on the recent method-
ology from De Loecker & Warzynski (2012), which allows us to compute
time-varying, firm-specific markups, we show that the introduction of the
euro has led to a significant decrease in the average markup of almost 14
percentage points. We find that the generalization of the use of the euro in
2002 had a more pronounced pro-competitive impact on markups (almost
three times as large) as the mere establishment in 1999 of fixed exchange
rates among eurozone countries.
Importantly, the launch of the euro has been an asymmetric shock for
French manufacturing firms. First, depending on their export destination,
the euro shock benefitted eurozone exporters in 1999 relative to all other
companies and harmed global exporters more severely for the 2002 period.
Our interpretation is that the introduction of the euro has had two opposite
effects on the level of markups: (i) by reducing transaction costs for firms
trading with euro-countries, the euro represented an opportunity for euro-
zone exporters to increase their price-cost margins relative to other firms in
the sample; and (ii) by increasing competition, we find that all firms signifi-
cantly reduced their markups.
The above conclusions hold regardless of the export status. However,
global exporters are those whose markups suffered most from 2002 onward.
This is because since global exporters are those who export most to the
eurozone, they were the most exposed to the competitive shock of 2002.
Moreover, the appreciation of the nominal exchange rate vis-a-vis other cur-
rencies represented a negative competitive shock for French products; they
coped with this shock by compressing their margin. Non-eurozone exporters,
who were not concerned with the opportunity effect or the competitive effect,
did not experience a decrease in their markups relative to non-exporters. We
believe that this illustrates a narrower window of adjustment to reduce their
margins as a response to the appreciation of the euro, which forced some of
them to exit foreign markets.
Second, quantile regressions show that the creation of the euro led to a
reduction in the heterogeneity of firm markups. Because firm markups have
a lower bound at unity, the magnitude of adjustment for firms with initially
high markups is simply larger. As such, in addition to moving the whole dis-
tribution of markups leftward, the introduction of the euro induced a more
uniform distribution of market power across firms. Increased competition
from low-wage countries and openness are strong drivers of asymmetric po-
sition in markets and benefit firms that have products with lower degrees of
substitution, that is, higher markups.
Our results are robust to a range of specifications, whether we consider
the export status in a DID model or whether we quantify the exposure of
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the firm to the establishment of the euro, and across various sub-samples,
controlling for firms exiting from or entering into either domestic markets
or foreign destinations or considering non-eurozone exporters as a relevant
counterfactual.
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Appendix A. Data Appendix
All nominal output and inputs variables are available at the firm level. In-
dustry level information is used for price indexes, number of hours worked
and depreciation rates of capital.
Output. Our Output variable, Q, is value added deflated by sector-
specific price indexes for value added. These indexes are available at the
2-digit level published by INSEE (French Office of Statistics).
Labor. We define our labor variable, L, as the number of effective work-
ers multiplied by the the number of hours worked in a year. The annual
series for worked hours are available at the 2-digit industry level and pro-
vided by GGDC Groningen Growth Development Center. This choice was
made because there are no data on hours worked in the EAE datasets.
Capital input Capital stocks, K, are computed using information on
investment and book value of tangible assets (we rely on book value reported
at the end of the accounting exercise), following the traditional permanent
inventory methodology:
Kt = (1− δt−1) Kt−1 + It (A.1)
where δt is the depreciation rate and It is real investment (deflated nomi-
nal investment). Both investment price indexes and depreciation rates are
available at the 2-digit industrial classification from the INSEE data series.
Intermediate inputs. Intermediate inputs,M , are defined as purchases
of materials and merchandise, transport and travel, and miscellaneous ex-
penses. They are deflated using sectoral price indexes for intermediate inputs
published by INSEE.
Revenue shares. To compute the revenue share of labor, we rely on
the variable wages and compensation. This value includes total wages paid
to salaries, plus social contribution and income tax withholding.
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Appendix B. The Matching Method
We choose the matching method to pre-process our sample in order to obtain
a set of observations sharing similar characteristics. These characteristics are
supposed to affect the response of firms in their markups above and beyond
the export status. We mainly think of firm size (Y ), all factors of production
K, L and M , and TFP ω, being a non linear transformation of the series of
output and inputs. We do not include a time fixed effect because we perform
the matching procedure for year 1997, two years prior to the introduction of
the euro.
We wish to produce a set of observations similar to firms exporting es-
sentially in the eurozone, which we then consider as the treated group. All
other firms are then considered non treated. Let T denote the treated group,
we set T = 1 if αEZ > .9, 0 otherwise, where αEZ is the share of exports
to the eurozone. This produces a dataset of 6,367 companies in 1997, 204
of which exports essentially or exclusively to the eurozone. The matching is
then performed by:
Pr(T = 1|ω, y, k, l,m) = Φ(ω, y, k, l,m) (B.1)
where lower case denote the log-transformed values of the variables pre-
viously defined, and Φ is the logit function. The model is estimated by
maximum likelihood and produces the propensity score, which is simply the
predicted probability of a company being treated. We then compose the
counterfactual by including the three nearest neighbors, chosen from the
non treated group for each treated firm in our sample.
Table B1 presents the results of the matching procedure. The first column
present the estimated coefficients from model B.1 on all 6,367 observations
from year 1997. It shows that there exists important differences between
treated and non treated firms of all dimensions, with the exception of labor.
Pairwise Student t-tests exhibit also systematic differences across the two
groups. Using results from the logit model to produce the propensity score
yields a dataset composed of 790 firms, 586 of which do not export or export
a minor part of their production to the eurozone. Performing the logistic
regression on the treated and counterfactual set of firms and the pairwise
student t-tests show no systematic differences between the two groups.
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Table B1: Results from the Matching Procedure (] Treated = 204)
Logit (1) x¯T=1 x¯T=0 Logit (2) x¯CF
ω 1.367* 1.424 1.395 .951 1.416
(.779) [1.49] ( 1.308) [0.32]
y -1.342*** 9.323 9.167 -.309 9.405
(.488) [1.55] (.584) [-0.61]
k .474*** 8.026 7.646*** .023 8.117
(.102) [3.18] (.129) [-0.60]
l .469 11.93 11.88 .428 11.99
(.411) [0.65] (.589) [-0.56]
m .594* 8.825 8.600** -.029 8.908
(.334) [1.96] (.453) [-0.57]
Log Likelihood -887.2 -282.4
Ps. R-squared .017 .001
LR χ2 30.79*** 1.31
] Firms 6,367 790
] Non Treated 6,163 586
Standard errors in parentheses. T-statistics in squared brackets pro-
duced from a Student t-test comparing the set of treated firms with
the set of other firms. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. x¯T=1: Mean
of treated firms where x ∈ {ω, y, k, l,m}; x¯T=0: Mean of non treated
firms; x¯CF : Mean of firms included in the counterfactual.
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Figure 1: Evolution of markups between 1995 and 2007. The solid line, the
marker "x" and vertical lines indicate the mean, median, and interquartile
range, respectively.
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Table 2: Participation Rates (PR), Export Intensity (EI), Entry Rates (ER)
and Exit Rates (XR), by Export Market and Time Period
Time Period ] Obs. All DestEZ DestNEZ
All Periods 1995-2007 215,186 PR 72.8 57.7 67.9
EI 28.2 13.6 14.6
ER 5.0 4.9 6.3
XR 4.7 4.5 6.2
Period 1995-1998 67,770 PR 71.6 54.8 69.0
EI 28.4 12.7 15.7
ER 4.7 5.0 5.2
XR 3.6 3.9 4.1
Period 1999-2001 51,322 PR 73.9 60.3 67.1
EI 29.4 15.0 14.4
ER 5.3 6.2 6.7
XR 5.2 4.8 8.2
Period 2002-2007 96,094 PR 73.2 58.4 67.6
EI 27.5 13.4 14.1
ER 5.1 4.1 6.9
XR 5.2 4.8 6.7
DEZ : Eurozone markets; DNEZ : Outside eurozone markets. The
participation rate (PR) is defined as the number of firm-year export-
ing (to all markets, to the eurozone and to non-eurozone markets,
respectively) over the overall number of firm-years. Export intensity
(EI) displays exports values divided by sales, by destination markets.
The entry rate (ER) is computed as the ratio of the number of firms
new to exports (or new to the eurozone and to non-eurozone mar-
kets, respectively) over the number of firms exporting. The exit rate
(XR) is computed as the ratio of the number of firms withdrawing
from export markets (or from the eurozone and from non-eurozone
markets, respectively) over the number of firms exporting.
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Table 3: Computed Markups and Productivity Indices, by Time Period and
Export Status
Export Status Time Period Share µ¯ σµ IQRµ ω¯ σω IQRω
All firms 1995-2007 100 1.339 0.388 0.456 1.478 0.270 0.272
All firms 1995-1998 100 1.398 0.379 0.442 1.421 0.254 0.256
All firms 1999-2001 100 1.381 0.404 0.467 1.455 0.267 0.261
All firms 2002-2007 100 1.274 0.376 0.439 1.530 0.273 0.276
Non exporters (NX) 1995-2007 27.1 1.251 0.337 0.401 1.460 0.223 0.231
Non exporters 1995-1998 28.4 1.310 0.325 0.386 1.409 0.207 0.226
Non exporters 1999-2001 26.1 1.281 0.352 0.403 1.427 0.226 0.220
Non exporters 2002-2007 26.8 1.192 0.329 0.381 1.515 0.220 0.234
Eurozone only (EZ) 1995-2007 5.0 1.345 0.389 0.470 1.513 0.260 0.251
Eurozone only 1995-1998 2.6 1.396 0.368 0.430 1.423 0.218 0.213
Eurozone only 1999-2001 6.8 1.380 0.399 0.490 1.477 0.242 0.235
Eurozone only 2002-2007 5.6 1.306 0.386 0.466 1.565 0.272 0.263
Outside EZ (NEZ) 1995-2007 15.1 1.289 0.363 0.433 1.488 0.232 0.237
Outside EZ 1995-1998 16.8 1.348 0.353 0.421 1.439 0.217 0.220
Outside EZ 1999-2001 13.6 1.321 0.377 0.442 1.470 0.225 0.224
Outside EZ 2002-2007 14.8 1.225 0.354 0.413 1.537 0.237 0.243
Global (G) 1995-2007 52.8 1.397 0.409 0.481 1.481 0.301 0.310
Global 1995-1998 52.1 1.463 0.403 0.472 1.423 0.288 0.293
Global 1999-2001 53.5 1.445 0.422 0.487 1.461 0.296 0.301
Global 2002-2007 52.8 1.326 0.395 0.460 1.532 0.304 0.316
IQR: Interquartile range
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Table 4: Student t and Kolmogorov-Smirnov Comparison Tests for Markups
and Productivity Indices
Comparison t Conclusion D Conclusion
Markup µ
EZ vs NX 25.8 µ¯EZ ≥ µ¯NX −0.102 F (EZ) ≥ F (NX)
EZ vs NEZ 13.7 µ¯EZ ≥ µ¯NEZ −0.061 F (EZ) ≥ F (NEZ)
EZ vs G −12.6 µ¯EZ ≤ µ¯G 0.069 F (EZ) ≤ F (G)
NEZ vs NX 15.5 µ¯NEZ ≥ µ¯NX −0.044 F (NEZ) ≥ F (NX)
NEZ vs G −43.3 µ¯NEZ ≤ µ¯G 0.118 F (NEZ) ≤ F (G)
G vs NX 74.2 µ¯G ≥ µ¯NX −0.160 F (G) ≥ F (NX)
P2 vs P1 −7.4 µ¯P2 ≥ µP1 0.043 F (P2) ≤ F (P1)
P3 vs P1 −65.5 µ¯P3 ≥ µP1 0.126 F (P3) ≤ F (P1)
P3 vs P2 −50.7 µ¯P3 ≥ µP2 0.128 F (P3) ≤ F (P2)
Total Factor Productivity ω
EZ vs NX 21.9 ω¯EZ ≥ ω¯NX −0.070 F (EZ) ≥ F (NX)
EZ vs NEZ 9.2 ω¯EZ ≥ ω¯NEZ −0.038 F (EZ) ≥ F (NEZ)
EZ vs G 10.5 ω¯EZ ≥ ω¯G −0.096 F (EZ) ≥ F (G)
NEZ vs NX 18.1 ω¯NEZ ≥ ω¯NX −0.042 F (NEZ) ≥ F (NX)
NEZ vs G 4.0 ω¯NEZ ≥ ω¯G −0.087 F (NEZ) ≥ F (G)
G vs NX 15.0 ω¯G ≥ ω¯NX −0.075 F (G) ≥ F (NX)
P2 vs P1 21.7 ω¯P2 ≥ ω¯P1 −0.060 F (P2) ≥ F (P1)
P3 vs P1 81.7 ω¯P3 ≥ ω¯P1 −0.121 F (P3) ≥ F (P1)
P3 vs P2 51.0 ω¯P3 ≥ ω¯P2 −0.144 F (P3) ≥ F (P2)
All tests are significant at the 1% level: the Student t-test H0: xG1 = xG2 ,
where x stands for either markups µ or total factor productivity ω, and the KS
test for stochastic dominance of F (G1) over F (G2), where F (·) is the cumula-
tive distribution of either markups µ or total factor productivity ω. P1 stands
for period 1995-1998, P2 stands for period 1999-2001, and P3 stands for period
2002-2007. NX, EZ, NEZ and G represent non-exporters, eurozone exporters,
exporters outside the eurozone and global exporters, respectively.
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Table 6: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Median St.Dev. Min. Max.
Markup (µ) 1.339 1.280 0.388 0.206 4.337
TFP (ω) 1.478 1.466 0.270 -3.466 6.472
Sales (logs) 8.923 8.724 1.210 3.877 16.900
LW Import Share 0.086 0.052 0.090 0.002 0.387
Openness 2.728 2.253 2.228 0.570 43.230
Exporters 0.729 1.000 0.445 0.000 1.000
EZ only 0.050 0.000 0.217 0.000 1.000
NEZ only 0.151 0.000 0.358 0.000 1.000
Global 0.528 1.000 0.499 0.000 1.000
38
Table 7: Sequential OLS Regressions – Dependent Variable: Markup µ –
1995-2007
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post 1999 -0.030*** -0.032*** -0.027*** -0.037***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Post 2002 -0.124*** -0.123*** -0.123*** -0.109***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
TFP (ω) 0.143*** 0.145*** 0.145*** 0.145***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
EZ only 0.098*** 0.084*** 0.084***
(0.004) (0.009) (0.009)
NEZ only 0.032*** 0.034*** 0.034***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Global 0.144*** 0.151*** 0.151***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
EZ × Post 1999 0.016* 0.008
(0.010) (0.011)
NEZ × Post 1999 -0.003 -0.000
(0.005) (0.007)
Global × Post 1999 -0.010** 0.008
(0.004) (0.005)
EZ × Post 2002 0.015
(0.009)
NEZ × Post 2002 -0.004
(0.006)
Global × Post 2002 -0.028***
(0.005)
Exporters 0.118***
(0.002)
Constant 1.107*** 1.106*** 1.102*** 1.102***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Observations 215,049 215,049 215,049 215,049
R-squared 0.051 0.061 0.061 0.062
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1. All regressions include a linear time trend.
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Table 8: Firm-Level Markups and Export Status – 1995-2007
(5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Post 1999 -0.033*** -0.036*** -0.046*** -0.068*** -0.043**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.020)
Post 2002 -0.101*** -0.096*** -0.092*** -0.104*** -0.036*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.007) (0.018)
TFP (ω) 0.083*** 0.114*** 0.092*** 0.187*** 0.106
(0.014) (0.017) (0.026) (0.034) (0.073)
EZ × Post 1999 0.022*** 0.031*** 0.052* 0.049* 0.090*
(0.008) (0.009) (0.028) (0.027) (0.050)
NEZ × Post 1999 0.002 0.001 0.014** 0.016* 0.034
(0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.032)
Global × Post 1999 0.002 0.002 0.016*** 0.019*** 0.009*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.019)
EZ × Post 2002 0.000 -0.007 -0.016 -0.024 -0.138**
(0.006) (0.007) (0.031) (0.027) (0.058)
NEZ × Post 2002 0.004 0.007 0.004 -0.000 -0.056*
(0.004) (0.005) (0.009) (0.008) (0.029)
Global × Post 2002 -0.024*** -0.025*** -0.028*** -0.031*** -0.084***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.018)
Sales (logs) 0.165*** 0.176*** 0.189*** 0.187*** 0.250***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.021)
LW imports -0.291*** -0.307*** -0.287*** -0.511*** 0.029
(0.053) (0.060) (0.076) (0.108) (0.339)
Openness -0.004 -0.006 -0.001 -0.028** 0.012
(0.005) (0.006) (0.010) (0.014) (0.024)
Constant -0.134*** -0.286*** -0.390*** -0.484*** -0.932***
(0.038) (0.047) (0.061) (0.086) (0.211)
Observations 215,049 148,428 82,137 20,655 8,166
R-squared 0.151 0.181 0.202 0.309 0.248
Number of Firms 29,178 12,515 6,908 6,908 790
Robust standard errors in parentheses in all regressions. Block bootstrap standard
errors displayed in regression (8). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions
include a linear time trend. Regression (5) includes all observations. Regression
(6) includes firms present at least from 1998 to 2003. Regression (7) include
firms that do not change export status. Regression (8) collapses all firm-year
variables into firm period (1995-1998; 1999-2001; 2002-2007). Regression (9) uses
the sample of firms resulting from the matching procedure (see text).
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Table 9: Firm-Level Markups and Intensity of Exports to the Eurozone –
1995-2007
(10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Post 1999 -0.034*** -0.038*** -0.040*** -0.061*** -0.058***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.015)
Post 2002 -0.105*** -0.099*** -0.097*** -0.110*** -0.069***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.013)
TFP (ω) 0.083*** 0.113*** 0.093*** 0.188*** 0.105
(0.014) (0.017) (0.024) (0.034) (0.073)
αEZ 0.002 0.006 0.020** 0.025** 0.028
(0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.013) (0.027)
αEZ× Post 1999 0.006 0.010** 0.014** 0.015* 0.039**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.020)
αEZ× Post 2002 -0.022*** -0.027*** -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.075***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.021)
Exports (logs) 0.001** 0.001*** 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.004
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004)
Sales (logs) 0.164*** 0.174*** 0.186*** 0.182*** 0.246***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.021)
LW imports -0.299*** -0.317*** -0.289*** -0.518*** -0.122
(0.053) (0.060) (0.081) (0.108) (0.023)
Openness -0.005 -0.007 -0.002 -0.031** -0.017
(0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.014) (0.023)
Constant -0.130*** -0.279*** -0.407*** -0.503*** 0.968***
(0.038) (0.046) (0.063) (0.085) (0.214)
Observations 215,049 148,428 82,137 20,655 8,166
R-squared 0.150 0.180 0.202 0.309 0.248
Number of Firms 29,178 12,515 6,908 6,908 790
Robust standard errors in parentheses in all regressions. Block bootstrap stan-
dard errors displayed in regression (12). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All
regressions include a linear time trend. Regression (10) includes all observations.
Regression (11) includes firms present at least from 1998 to 2003. Regression
(12) includes firms that do not change export status. Regression (13) collapses
all firm-year variables into firm period (1995-1998; 1999-2001; 2002-2007). Re-
gression (14) uses the sample of firms resulting from the matching procedure
(see text).
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Table 10: Fixed Effect Quantile Regressions – Dependent Variable: Firm-
Level Markup µ˘ – Restricted Sample 1995-2007, N = 82, 137
(12) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19)
LSDV τ = 0.1 τ = 0.25 τ = 0.5 τ = 0.75 τ = 0.9
Post 1999 -0.040*** -0.007 -0.019*** -0.035*** -0.055*** -0.067***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006)
Post 2002 -0.097*** -0.084*** -0.079*** -0.078*** -0.090*** -0.112***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
TFP (ω) 0.093*** 0.007* 0.057*** 0.094*** 0.135*** 0.186***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
αEZ 0.020*** 0.006 0.012*** 0.020*** 0.027*** 0.037***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.010)
αEZ× Post 1999 0.014*** 0.027*** 0.015*** 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.004
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.013)
αEZ× Post 2002 -0.038*** -0.047*** -0.032*** -0.035*** -0.037*** -0.042***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008)
Exports (logs) 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sales (logs) 0.186*** 0.175*** 0.181*** 0.187*** 0.192*** 0.199***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
LW Import -0.289*** -0.408*** -0.360*** -0.296*** -0.227*** -0.163***
(0.008) (0.013) (0.008) (0.006) (0.010) (0.013)
Openness -0.002** -0.015*** -0.007*** -0.001 0.004*** 0.009***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant -0.407*** -0.348*** -0.390*** -0.413*** -0.438*** -0.479***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.011)
Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions
include a linear time trend. The restricted sample includes firms present at least from
1998 to 2003 that do not change export status. Column (15) displays the results of a fixed
effect least squares regression (R-squared = 0.713).
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